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1. Introduction  
 
Economics as a discipline can be thought of as the art of trading off benefits and costs of 
decisions and finding optimal solutions to these trade-offs. Despite this omnipresence of 
trade-offs in economics, a 'big' one that sticks out as particularly prominent is the trade-off 
between efficiency and equality (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2001, chap. 19). While average 
income and economic equality could in principle go hand in hand, at least when efficiency has 
already been optimized and the economy operates on its Pareto frontier, redistribution in favor 
of the poor will very likely come at a cost in terms of average income achieved.  
 
The inequality within an economy will be partly predetermined by history, like the detection 
and appropriation of natural resources or the inheritance of colonial roots, to give some 
obvious examples. At the same time, there are different ways in which countries can influence 
the 'big' trade-off. Redistribution via taxes and government transfers, which usually leads to 
deadweight losses, is an obvious candidate.
1 Unequal income and accumulation of wealth 
may also be fostered by certain educational systems, ethical heterogeneity, restrictions on 
competition in output markets, the shape of labor market rules, and the definition of property 
rights more generally.  
 
The present paper sheds light on how different developed economies fare in this trade-off 
between efficiency and equality by taking a bird's eye view. That is, we will not go into the 
details of which specific factors may have shaped the actual outcome and we therefore leave 
aside the topical question of how globalization has influenced income distributions over time.
2 
Instead we aim at ranking the actually observed income distributions of countries from the 
point of view of a potential entrant who only cares about the income distribution of countries 
after redistributive measures. From the point of view of policy makers who cannot be held 
responsible for inherited factors shaping the income distribution, ranking countries according 
to such a bird's eye view may be considered unfair. Indeed, it may be deemed unfair to the 
same extent as comparing the gross domestic product per capita of countries with very 
different histories and natural resources. Still, those comparisons are ubiquitous and generally 
considered helpful and illustrative. It is in the same sense that we think the rankings produced 
in this paper are illustrative and indicative.  
                                                 
1 It has been pointed out that government redistribution may be efficiency enhancing when private insurance 
markets are incomplete (Sinn 1995).  
2 See Sutcliffe (2004) for a recent survey.   2
 
Clearly, a ranking of country characteristics will strongly depend on the assumed preferences 
of an 'impartial' potential entrant and it will therefore not be possible to arrive at a unique 
ranking. The answer to the question of whether, say Denmark, with mild inequality, but also a 
lower average income has a 'better' income distribution than the U.S. is certainly a value 
judgment that, irrespective of its specific result is open to debate. At the very least, a 
scientifically based comparison requires that the result of the comparison is objective and the 
basis of the judgment is interpersonally communicable. The approach taken in this paper is to 
use the veil of ignorance approach as suggested by Rawls (1971) and Harsanyi (1953). Given 
that our potential entrant, when born into a certain country, receives a random draw of income 
from the same income distribution as it is represented by the income of the individuals already 
present in that country, what country would this entrant prefer to be born into? As an 
example, would she prefer to be born into the U.S. rather than into Denmark? This question 
cannot be answered without defining a preference structure. The crucial issue for the choice 
between a high income and a lower risk of being poor is the amount of risk aversion assumed. 
A risk neutral individual will prefer the country with the higher average income, while a 
strong risk averter may prefer the country where the poor are relatively better off. Therefore, 
the topic of this paper may be paraphrased by the following question. How risk averse does a 
person need to be to prefer to be born into Denmark, rather than into the U.S., which would 
obviously promise the higher expected income? More generally, we will rank a whole set of 
industrialized countries based on different assumptions about the risk aversion of a potential 
entrant.  
 
This potential entrant is conceptually different from real world migrants who can base their 
migration decisions on more precise information about the prospective income that they may 
earn as they know their occupation, age, gender, etc. Conversely, our fictitious entrant is 
assumed to find herself in the shoes of any inhabitant that is living in the respective economy 
with the same probability.  
 
The idea of evaluating income distributions from behind a fictitious veil of ignorance has 
been around for decades. As to our knowledge, however, this paper is the first study to fill this 
concept with empirical content and apply it to countries' actual income distributions. While 
the assumed risk preferences of our entrant are open for discussion, it may be noted that the 
sheer introduction of her utility function as a benchmark for the evaluation of distributions   3
already implies a value judgment. Again, this is nothing new as it is well-known from 
Atkinson (1970) that the complete ranking of income distributions requires the formulation of 
some sort of a social welfare function. The novelty of this paper is that we do not restrict the 
use of the social welfare function (the expected utility of the 'impartial' observer) to the 
evaluation of different degrees of inequality, as done in Atkinson's seminal paper, but allow it 
to also make an evaluation of the trade-off between inequality and per capita income.  
 
The basic methodology of the paper will imply using utility functions with different but 
constant degrees of relative risk aversion and to apply these to large representative samples of 
the income distributions of OECD countries. Observed net disposable income in these 
samples is then used to calculate expected utility indices and certainty equivalent incomes 
(CEI). Comparing these CEIs allows rankings of countries that indicate in which country an 
individual should prefer to be born into, given a certain coefficient of risk aversion.   
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Comparison of countries behind the veil of ignorance 
 
Consider a set of countries i = 1…m with populations of mass Ni. In each country we observe 
an income distribution Fi(yi) = Pi (Yi  yi) and the density function fi(yi). With respect to the 
preferences of a potential hypothetical entrant in one of these countries we make  
 
Assumption 1. The hypothetical entrant is endowed with an exogenous utility function U(y), 
where y is real income. That is, the utility function is independent of the country he or she 
chooses.  
 
Assuming an exogenous utility function to gauge the attractiveness of income distributions is 
a natural way to proceed and to preserve objectivity. It also follows the spirit of Atkinson 
(1970), who suggests a uniform inequality aversion for comparing income distributions. At 
the same time, it may be mentioned that it could be argued that risk preferences may actually 
be correlated with the inequality in a country because individuals with a low risk aversion 
may lead to high risk taking and hence high inequality (Friedman 1953). There may also be an 
adaptation of preferences to the country one lives in. Patriotism and nationalism are self 
evident examples of the endogeneity of preferences and people may also adapt to 'like' the   4
amount of redistribution they see in their country. For the sake of objectivity, we push aside 
these issues.  
 
Employing the concept of the veil of ignorance, which implies that each position in an 
economy is equally likely for an entrant, the expected utility from being introduced into 
country i is given by 
 
(1) E i[U(yi)] =  ) ( d ) (
1
0
i i i y F y U  .  
 
The hypothetical entrant will prefer country i over j if Ei[U(yi)] > Ej[U(yj)].  
Several additional assumptions are necessary to apply this concept to real world comparison 
between countries. First, data on income distribution typically contain information on family 
income, while income distributions for individuals are not directly available. Empirical 
researchers have evaded this problem by postulating equivalence scales that are used to 
transform observed family income into effective individual income. The dominant way of 
doing so is to use a scaling factor that decreases in family size, which is used to multiply by 




Assumption 2. Family size z and real family income w lead to effective per capita income y 
such that for each member of family h in country i we have 
i
h hi hi z w y
 /   with   i i     . 
The utility of a member of family h in country i can be written as U = U(yhi).   
 
Assuming that our hypothetical entrant is introduced into his or her preferred country and 
takes on any position with the appropriate probability implies that he or she can be 'born' as a 
child, an adult or even as a retiree.
4 Lifetime happiness will in general depend on the age he or 
she finds herself in after entrance. An alternative assumption could be that the entrant is 
indeed born into the respective country as a child, but then a prediction of his or her income 
over the lifecycle would be necessary. Indeed, since utility during childhood depends on the 
                                                 
3 Phipps and Garner (1994) compare equivalence scales for Canada and the U.S. and conclude that "equivalence 
scales for the two countries are not, in general, statistically different when estimated in the same way." 
Lancaster, Ray and Valenzuela (1999) conclude that the developed countries in their sample confirm the finding 
by Phipps and Garner.  
4 For this reason, in the reminder of the paper, the word born will be put in quotation marks to make clear that 
our hypothetical entrant is not assumed to be born as an infant.    5
income of the parents, detailed information about intergenerational income mobility would 
also be required. In the absence of cross-country data on income mobility we decided to make 
 
Assumption 3. The hypothetical entrant is born into any position of his or her preferred 
country and lives for one period, only.  
 
While this assumption is stark, it is appropriate to emphasize that an equivalent assumption is 
implicitly behind any normative cross-country comparison of income distributions. 
Comparing those distributions across countries makes sense only if there is agreement that a 
snapshot of observed yearly income is welfare relevant.  
 
Assumption 4. To make our approach operational, we will restrict our attention to utility 
functions with a constant Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, :  





   
 
1 ) ln(







It may be noted that given two income distributions indexed 1 and 2, an increase in  may 
have a non-monotonous effect on the relative preference for the two income distributions. For 
  1, the difference in the expected utility of the two distributions with density functions 
2 1, f f  may be written as  
  y y f y f y y U E y U E d ) ( ) ( ) 1 / 1 ( )] ( [ )] ( [ 2 1
) 1 (
2 1          
  .  
Hence    y y f y f y d ) ( ) ( d / d 2 1     
  .  
The sign of the difference of the densities may change arbitrarily often as y increases. Since a 
change in  will accentuate the difference at different incomes in a nonlinear way the sign of  
  d / d  may change. We may note this as  
 
Observation 1. Changing the assumption about the preference parameter  can lead to 
multiple preference reversals when is changed. In other words, given two income 
distributions,  2 1,F F , it may be that at a low levels of ,  1 F  is preferred over  2 F , at medium 
levels  2 F  is considered better than  1 F , but at high levels of , we again observe that  1 F  is 
preferred over  2 F .  
   6
 
2.2  Comparisons across countries and across time using the 
Atkinson index 
 
Comparing the well-being of heterogeneous individuals across countries is one possible way 
of applying the veil of ignorance approach to real-world data. Another, related use is to 
compare a welfare index for a given country over time. A sizeable literature has questioned 
the practice to concentrate on observing per capita income growth and has developed the idea 
of pro-poor growth. A growing number of scholars in recent years have taken up ideas by 
Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) and other have demanded that the income of particularly 
needy groups should increase and/or particular measures of poverty should decrease (see, e.g., 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Son (2004), Kraay (2004) or Son and Kakwani (2008)) to 
provide for 'pro-poor growth'. 
 
In line with these contributions we suggest that a growth in real per capita income is not 
enough to warrant an improvement. Rather, our concept invokes the assumptions made in the 
section above to evaluate whether, behind a veil of ignorance, there has been a preferable 
change of income. Intuitively, the question that we pose here is whether a hypothetical risk-
averse entrant would prefer to be 'born' into a specific country at year t = 0 or rather at a later 
year t = 1 with the expected utility index (or equivalently CEI) from these two options 
indicating the preference order. Since the income distribution of future years is unknown, the 
question more appropriately may be phrased as whether the hypothetical entrant would have 
preferred to be 'born' into a previous time period. Given the availability of a country's micro 
data on the income distribution at two or more points in time, it is possible to calculate the 
change in expected utility using (1).  
 
Ideally, accurate calculation of the change in expected utility requires knowledge about the 
complete income distribution at two or more points in time or for two countries. Our access to 
such micro data has given us the opportunity to undertake this kind of analysis. We may note, 
however, that access to micro data becomes dispensable if information on the value of 
average income and of the Atkinson's (1970) index of inequality is provided by agencies with 
access to the micro data. Invoking the veil of ignorance interpretation of Atkinson' index 
(Dahlby 1987), where the utility function follows the functional form of equation (2), the 
Atkinson A() index is given by the expected income  and the certainty equivalent C() of 








A .  
 
Hence, the risk premium R =  – C() =   A() and the certainty equivalent can be written 
as  
 
(4)   C() = (1 – A()) 
 
At the same time,  
 
(5)   E[U(y)] = ) ( d ) (
1
0
y F y U i  = U(C()) = U((1 – A())).   
 
From (5) it is clear that for any expected utility function U with constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA), as assumed for the calculation of the Atkinson index, comparisons of income 
distributions across countries and across times can be carried out by restricting attention to 
and A. If, as a special case, we consider the special case of logarithmic utility, i.e. U(y) = 
ln(y), then we can rewrite the expected utility and any change of it as  
 
(6)     E[U(y)] = ln() + ln(1 – A()) 
 
(7)     E[U(y)] = ln() + ln(1 – A(1)) 
 
There are two obvious applications of equations (5) and (7). One has been mentioned above 
and relates to the comparison of a country's income distribution over time. From our veil of 
ignorance approach, the change in income distribution may be evaluated by simply looking at 
the change in the logarithm of average income and the change in the logarithm of one minus 
the Atkinson index. Clearly, for small changes the differences in logarithms can be 
approximated by the respective growth rates. 
 
In addition, we can also apply the result in equation (5) and (7) to perform cross country 
comparisons. If we are prepared to restrict attention to the logarithmic case, a comparison of 
the income distributions of two countries can be carried out by looking at average income and 
the Atkinson index when going from one to the other country. While for some countries   8
individual household data on income distribution may be confidential and sometimes difficult 
to access, the Atkinson measure for the logarithmic case ( = 1) is more broadly reported. 
Therefore, the result derived in equation (7) tends to extend the applicability of the veil of 
ignorance approach proposed here.  
 
We should mention that Son and Kakwani (2008) have recently observed in passing the 
potential usefulness of the Atkinson measure to evaluate the existence of pro-poor growth, but 
without implementation into an expected utility or veil of ignorance setting and without 
acknowledging its value in cross country comparisons. In their empirical implementation they 
discard the Atkinson measure and give preferences to an alternative measure of pro-poor 
growth. A paper that discusses the application of the Atkinson measure to arrive at inequality 
corrected measures of income is Gruen and Klasen (2008). There are several differences to 
the present paper, though. First, Gruen and Klasen derive their results from aggregate figures 
of the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) that for example disallow discussion of 
gender issues. Unlike the present paper, Gruen and Klasen do not report explicit country 
rankings of certainty equivalent incomes, nor does their paper discuss inequality from a veil 
of ignorance perspective. A correction of effective income based on the Atkinson index has 
been proposed by Jenkins (1997), but his study is restricted to the development of inequality 
in the UK, only. 
 
3   Empirical cross country comparisons 
 
In this section we will make use of the data from the Luxembourg Income Study (2009-2011) 
(LIS; www.lisdatacenter.org) to compare income distributions across developed countries 
using the framework proposed above. The LIS data base brings together large representative 
household survey samples for most OECD countries. The LIS data consist of (so far six) 
different waves. Although we report results for all waves, the last wave (wave 6) with data 
from 2005 is currently available for considerably fewer countries. Thus, our cross country 
comparison concentrates mainly on wave 5 with data from (or around) year 2000. As of June 
2009, data for 24 countries were considered as closely comparable. While, in principle, data 
were available for three additional countries, these were excluded because of further data 
limitations.
5 
                                                 
5 Australia was excluded because income in the LIS files is based on gross income. While after tax income is 
modeled, social assistance is not reflected. Similar concerns about the inclusion of social assistance suggested 
exclusion of Mexico and Russia.    9
 
The main variable of interest is the effective per capita disposable income on the household 
level that reflects the income tax and social security payments by households and the transfers 
to households. The micro data, which are accessible via job submission, were handled 
according to standards set by numerous studies. To compare households with different sizes 
we invoked Assumption 2 and, in line with the vast majority of the existing literature, we set 
α = 0.5. As a standard LIS procedure to limit the effect of dubious data, for each country we 
bottom coded disposable income at the one percent of disposable personal income and top 
coded at ten times the median income (see Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, p. 661) and 
dropped observations with zero or missing disposable income. For sake of comparability, all 
income data were converted into US dollars by using purchasing power parities. To allow for 
differentiated results depending on household characteristics we merged the LIS household 
files, which contain disposable household income, with the underlying LIS person files, which 
inform about age and gender of household members.  
 
An obvious issue is the range of the risk aversion considered. For several reasons, we decided 
to restrict attention to 0 ≤  ≤ 2. A first reason is plausibility. Table 1 illustrates a situation 
where an individual with equal probability receives either $100,000 in a good state of the 
world or $10,000 in a bad state, so  = $55,000. The certainty equivalent income C() and the 
maximum premium [ – C()] of course depend on the assumed value of . As the reader may 
judge from Table 1,  values larger than two lead to unrealistically high insurance premia the 
individual would be willing to pay for receiving the certainty equivalent.
6 Confronted with a 
fifty-fifty chance of either receiving a yearly income $100,000 or $10,000 CRRA with  = 2.5 
produced a certainty equivalent of $15,548 and an insurance premium of roughly $40,000.  
                                                 
6 A similar upper level of  was suggested by Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) based on a different thought 
experiment. Assume the there are two equally likely states of the world with the lucky state providing twice as 
much wealth. Then the maximum sacrifice s an individual (with CRRA) is prepared to make in the good state to 
receive $1 in the bad state equals 2
. Observing that individuals with CRRA report that they do not want to trade 
in $8 in the good state for $1 in the bad state implies   < 3. As the literature on the equity puzzle suggests, 
efforts to derive risk attitudes from stock market behavior lead to puzzling rather than plausible results, although 
some extreme results have received wrong interpretations (Meyer and Meyer 2005).    10
Table 1: Certainty equivalent incomes, a simple example 
Good state  Bad state  C()   Maximum insurance premium 
100,000 $  10,000 $  55,000 $  0.00  0 $ 
100,000 $  10,000 $  43,311 $  0.50  11,689 $ 
100,000 $  10,000 $  31,623 $  1.00  23,377 $ 
100,000 $  10,000 $  23,089 $  1.50  31,911 $ 
100,000 $  10,000 $  18,182 $  2.00  36,818 $ 
100,000 $  10,000 $  15,548 $  2.50  39,452 $ 
100,000 $  10,000 $  14,072 $  3.00  40,928 $ 
 
Another reason for not considering more extreme values of  is that the value of the Atkinson 
measure becomes extremely sensitive to low values of incomes and data errors at the bottom 
of the distribution. For a discussion see Jenkins (1997). Starting with Atkinson (1970) the 
range 0 ≤  ≤ 2 is the standard range assumed by studies that compare inequality across 
countries. Finally, the literature on experimental results suggests that risk aversion outside this 
range is implausible (cf., e.g., Harrision and Rutström 2008). 
 
Making use of Assumptions 1-4, Table 2 reports on our calculations of the certainty 
equivalents for 24 specific countries.  When a potential entrant is risk neutral ( = 0) effective 
per capita income in 2000 was highest for Luxemburg (USD 31,040) and the US (USD 
29,018). Leaving aside Luxemburg, the US is clearly outperforming European countries in 
term of expected disposable income and this holds even more so when we compare the US to 
the EU countries in our sample, leaving aside rich non-EU Norway and Switzerland. Effective 
disposable per capita income in the US exceeds that in Germany by 40% and that in France by 
58%.  
 
Is it possible to revert the ordering by introducing risk aversion for our hypothetical entrant? 
While the top-5 positions keep unchanged if we introduce moderate levels of risk aversion, 
the US is overtaken by Switzerland for  ≥ 1, by Norway for  ≥ 1.5, by Denmark for   = 
1.75 and by Austria, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Taiwan for   = 2. In Table 2, all 
countries that either lose or gain at least four notches when moving from  = 0 to  = 2 are 
highlighted. All three Anglo-Saxon countries, UK, US and Canada, are in this group since 
they are losing at least 4 ranks. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Taiwan, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia are all gaining at least 4 notches. Although some affluent EU countries still fail to 
overtake the US, the relative distance of equivalized income is significantly smaller than with 
risk neutrality. For  = 2, the equivalized US per capita income is only 11% higher than that 
of France.    11
 
Does it matter that our hypothetical entrant is allowed to be ‘born’ as a child or pensioner? A 
variant of the calculations of certainty equivalents restricts the opportunity to be ‘born’ into a 
country by looking at prime age persons between age 25 and 59 and the income distribution 
that is relevant for the chances of becoming a poor or rich member of a given economy is 
derived from this age group only. While there are some changes in rankings, the picture with 
respect to the Europe/US comparison is quite similar. For values up to   ≤ 1.75, the US is 
overtaken by the same set of European countries and, with the exception of Germany, the set 
is also the same for   = 2. 
 
3.3.1 Cross Country Comparisons and Gender Differences 
An additional consideration of our cross-country comparison is the consideration of gender 
specific distributions. Does it matter whether we lift the veil of ignorance to inform a 
hypothetical entrant about his or her gender? Since by assumption the intra-family distribution 
is homogenous, the differences in the welfare of men and women must come from single 
households. Table 4 presents the rankings and the certainty equivalents derived for our set of 
24 countries in year 2000. For each country, the population is separated by gender. Therefore, 
for each value of , a country is ranked twice and certainty equivalents are reported for men 
and women separately. The appendix “ _f” denotes the ranking for females, “_m” the ranking 
of males. In the case of risk neutrality ( = 0) all countries follow the expected pattern and the 
expected income of men exceeds that of women. The same holds for all countries and  = 0.5 
or  = 1. With  = 1.5, the first reversal occurs for Poland;  = 1.75 brings about reversals in  
 
   12
Table 2: Country rankings and Certainty Equivalent Incomes 2000 ( US$ & PPP adjusted), General Population 
Rank   0    0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 
1   LU  31040    LU  29365   LU  28578   LU  27820   LU  27088   LU  26381   LU  25694 LU  25000 
2   US  29018    US  25692   US  24118   CH  22586   CH  21511   CH  20119   CH  18126 TW  16026 
3   CH  26184    CH  24393   CH  23516   US  22535   US  20869   NO  19270   NO  17757 DK  15723 
4   NO  23888    NO  22475   NO  21809   NO  21111   NO  20309   US  19007   DK  17199 NO  15456 
5   CA  23355    CA  21370   CA  20384   CA  19342   DK  18782   DK  18127   US  16804 NL  15361 
6   TW  21581    DK  20245   DK  19789   DK  19313   NL  18296   NL  17610   TW  16750 CH  15244 
7   AT  21220    TW  20106   AT  19419   NL  18863   CA  18161   TW  17425   NL  16693 BE  15038 
8   DK  21161    AT  20024   TW  19414   AT  18783   TW  18084   AT  17219   AT  16065 DE  14663 
9   NL  20792    NL  19851   NL  19371   TW  18743   AT  18076   BE  16777   BE  16001 AT  14368 
10   BE  20775    BE  19360   BE  18719   BE  18092   BE  17455   CA  16701   DE  15674 US  14164 
11    UK  20739    DE  19054   DE  18431   DE  17809   DE  17168   DE  16476   CA  14758 FI  13605 
12    DE  20358    UK  18654   UK  17660   UK  16641   SE  15661   FI  15011   FI  14423 FR  12706 
13   IE  19098    IE  17514   SE  16769   SE  16243   UK  15515   SE  14962   SE  14032 SE  12690 
14   FR  18364    SE  17274   IE  16751   FR  16079   FI  15492   FR  14817   FR  13953 CA  12195 
15   SE  18298    FR  17196   FR  16638   IE  15974   FR  15490   IE  14146   IE  12860 IE  11086 
16   ES  17772    FI  16786   FI  16356   FI  15930   IE  15134   UK  14145   UK  12339 UK  10000 
17   FI  17712    ES  16105   ES  15301   ES  14483   ES  13607   ES  12596   ES  11332 SI  9911 
18   IT  16882    IT  15298   IT  14537   IT  13765   IT  12942   IT  12003   IT  10845 ES  9690 
19   IL  16393    IL  14781   IL  14016   IL  13256   IL  12467   IL  11591   IL  10529 IT  9355 
20   GR  13698    GR  12437   SI  11957   SI  11603   SI  11233   SI  10838   SI  10404 IL  9149 
21   SI  12983    SI  12302   GR  11813   GR  11176   GR  10495   GR  9719   GR  8763 GR  7536 
22   EE  7278    PL  6631   PL  6366   PL  6076   HU  5750   HU  5547   HU  5333 HU  5089 
23   PL  7152    EE  6490   HU  6159   HU  5952   PL  5725   PL  5251   PL  4564 PL  3628 
24   HU  6842    HU  6374   EE  6114   EE  5730   EE  5308   EE  4804   EE  4160 EE  3355 
Annotations: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; CA: Canada; CH: Switzerland; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: Estonia; FI: Finland; FR: France; GR: Greece; HU: 
Hungary; IE: Ireland; IL: Israel; IT: Italy; LU: Luxemburg; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; PL: Poland; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; TW: Taiwan; UK: United Kingdom; US: 
United States. Certainty equivalents are calculated in 2000 US dollar using OECD purchasing power parities (PPP). PPPs for ES and IL have been taken from Penn World 
Tables. LIS data for HU, NL, PL, SI, and UK are for 1999. The calculations presented assume that all household incomes in these countries between 1999 and 2000 have risen 
according to the average growth rate of disposable household income (HU, PL, SI: growth rate of GDP).  
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Table 3: Country Rankings and Certainty Equivalent Incomes 2000 ( US$ & PPP adjusted), Prime Age Population 
Rank   0    0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 
1   LU  30367   LU  28806   LU  28065  LU  27348  LU  26653  LU  25979  LU  25323  LU  24691 
2   US  28209   US  24915   US  23356  CH  22102  CH  21104  CH  19826  CH  18005  NO  16474 
3   CH  25464   CH  23794   CH  22972  US  21795  US  20165  NO  18980  NO  17952  TW  15873 
4   NO  23031   NO  21680   NO  21060  NO  20435  NO  19765  US  18369  DK  16884  DK  15552 
5   CA  22807   CA  20855   CA  19886  CA  18866  DK  18338  DK  17727  TW  16622  CH  15337 
6   TW  21459   TW  19990   DK  19305  DK  18843  TW  17968  TW  17306  US  16285  NL  14925 
7   DK  20659   DK  19752   TW  19299  TW  18628  NL  17849  NL  17182  NL  16278  BE  14535 
8   AT  20452   NL  19351    NL  18887  NL  18397  CA  17717  AT  16625  AT  15559  AT  14025 
9   NL  20265    AT  19294   AT  18710  AT  18100  AT  17428  CA  16308  BE  15425  US  13812 
10   BE  20024   BE  18655   BE  18031  BE  17422  BE  16807  BE  16158  DE  14851  DE  13624 
11   UK  19959    DE  18463    DE  17833  DE  17197  DE  16525  DE  15772  CA  14451  FI  13569 
12   DE  19764    UK  17974    UK  17033  UK  16080  SE  15168  FI  14722  FI  14218  SE  12376 
13   IE  18594   IE  16936   FR  16303  FR  15744  FI  15159  SE  14505  SE  13635  FR  12195 
14   FR  18014   FR  16857   SE  16239  SE  15727  FR  15148  FR  14453  FR  13536  CA  12005 
15   SE  17740   SE  16733   IE  16163  FI  15573  UK  15044  UK  13809  IE  12427  IE  10776 
16   FI  17343   FI  16410   FI  15985  IE  15391  IE  14575  IE  13634  UK  12204  UK  10101 
17   ES  17319   ES  15668   ES  14871  ES  14055  ES  13173  ES  12140  ES  10828  SI  9718 
18   IT  16392   IT  14875   IT  14144  IT  13399  IT  12599  IT  11677  IT  10526  ES  9124 
19   IL  16093   IL  14523   IL  13781  IL  13045  IL  12284  IL  11443  IL  10425  IL  9099 
20   GR  13429   GR  12166   SI  11766  SI  11410  SI  11037  SI  10640  SI  10207  IT  9033 
21   SI  12801   SI  12114   GR  11539  GR  10896  GR  10211  GR  9439  GR  8505  GR  7331 
22   EE  7089   PL  6583   PL  6329  PL  6054  PL  5727  HU  5436  HU  5208  HU  4929 
23   PL  7087   EE  6326   HU  6053  HU  5846  HU  5643  PL  5288  PL  4653  PL  3768 
24   HU  6739   HU  6268   EE  5968  EE  5607  EE  5218  EE  4760  EE  4176  EE  3434 
Annotations: See Table 2. Prime age for our purposes is defined as older than 24 and younger than 60.  
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Table 4. Certainty Equivalent Incomes 2000 ( US$ & PPP adjusted) :  
General Population by Gender 
 0  0.5  1 1.5 1.75  2
Country 
LU_m  31726  LU_m  29941  LU_m  29108 LU_m  28309 LU_m  27541  LU_m  26800
LU_f  30367  LU_f  28806  LU_f  27348 LU_f  25979 LU_f  25323  LU_f  24691
US_m  29862  US_m  26517  US_m  23335 CH_m  20429 CH_m  18255  NO_f  16474
US_f  28209  CH_m  25023  CH_m  23100 CH_f  19826 CH_f  18005  TW_m  16181
CH_m  26931  US_f  24915  CH_f  22102 US_m  19709 NO_f  17952  DE_m  15974
CH_f  25464  CH_f  23794  NO_m  21817 NO_m  19569 NO_m  17559  DK_m  15898
NO_m  24753  NO_m  23291  US_f  21795 NO_f  18980 DK_m  17532  TW_f  15873
CA_m  23916  CA_m  21905  NO_f  20435 DK_m  18549 US_m  17381  NL_m  15798
NO_f  23031  NO_f  21680  CA_m  19843 US_f  18369 NL_m  17137  BE_m  15601
CA_f  22807  CA_f  20855  DK_m  19805 NL_m  18064 DK_f  16884  DK_f  15552
AT_m  22051  AT_m  20830  AT_m  19552 AT_m  17900 TW_m  16879  CH_f  15337
TW_m  21701  DK_m  20756  NL_m  19350 DK_f  17727 DE_m  16659  CH_m  15152
DK_m  21675  NL_m  20368  CA_f  18866 TW_m  17544 BE_m  16654  NL_f  14925
BE_m  21575  TW_m  20220  TW_m  18856 BE_m  17476 AT_m  16647  AT_m  14793
UK_m  21537  BE_m  20127  DK_f  18843 TW_f  17306 TW_f  16622  NO_m  14556
TW_f  21459  TW_f  19990  BE_m  18834 DE_m  17291 US_f  16285  US_m  14535
NL_m  21330  DK_f  19752  TW_f  18628 NL_f  17182 NL_f  16278  BE_f  14535
DE_m  20999  DE_m  19703  DE_m  18495 CA_m  17119 AT_f  15559  AT_f  14025
DK_f  20659  UK_m  19363  NL_f  18397 AT_f  16625 BE_f  15425  US_f  13812
AT_f  20452  NL_f  19351  AT_f  18100 CA_f  16308 CA_m  15086  FI_m  13643
NL_f  20265  AT_f  19294  BE_f  17422 BE_f  16158 DE_f  14851  DE_f  13624
BE_f  20024  BE_f  18655  UK_m  17236 DE_f  15772 FI_m  14644  FI_f  13569
UK_f  19959  DE_f  18463  DE_f  17197 SE_m  15457 SE_m  14465  FR_m  13316
DE_f  19764  IE_m  18110  SE_m  16794 FI_m  15324 CA_f  14451  SE_m  13021
IE_m  19610  UK_f  17974  IE_m  16587 FR_m  15226 FR_m  14428  CA_m  12392
SE_m  18875  SE_m  17843  FR_m  16448 FI_f  14722 FI_f  14218  SE_f  12376
FR_m  18741  FR_m  17567  FI_m  16314 IE_m  14696 SE_f  13635  FR_f  12195
IE_f  18594  FI_m  17186  UK_f  16080 SE_f  14505 FR_f  13536  CA_f  12005
ES_m  18250  IE_f  16936  FR_f  15744 UK_m  14501 IE_m  13325  IE_m  11416
FI_m  18100  FR_f  16857  SE_f  15727 FR_f  14453 UK_m  12480  IE_f  10776
FR_f  18014  SE_f  16733  FI_f  15573 UK_f  13809 IE_f  12427  ES_m  10363
SE_f  17740  ES_m  16573  IE_f  15391 IE_f  13634 UK_f  12204  SI_m  10121
IT_m  17402  FI_f  16410  ES_m  14946 ES_m  13105 ES_m  11907  UK_f  10101
FI_f  17343  IT_m  15753  IT_m  14164 IT_m  12363 IT_m  11202  UK_m  9891
ES_f  17319  ES_f  15668  ES_f  14055 ES_f  12140 ES_f  10828  IT_m  9728
IL_m  16707  IL_m  15053  IL_m  13480 IL_m  11750 IL_m  10639  SI_f  9718
IT_f  16392  IT_f  14875  IT_f  13399 IT_f  11677 SI_m  10618  IL_m  9200
IL_f  16093  IL_f  14523  IL_f  13045 IL_f  11443 IT_f  10526  ES_f  9124
GR_m  13985  GR_m  12729  SI_m  11811 SI_m  11051 IL_f  10425  IL_f  9099
GR_f  13429  SI_m  12502  GR_m  11484 SI_f  10640 SI_f  10207  IT_f  9033
SI_m  13176  GR_f  12166  SI_f  11410 GR_m  10033 GR_m  9057  GR_m  7770
SI_f  12801  SI_f  12114  GR_f  10896 GR_f  9439 GR_f  8505  GR_f  7331
EE_m  7495  PL_m  6684  PL_m  6100 HU_m  5682 HU_m  5487  HU_m  5291
PL_m  7223.3  EE_m  6681  HU_m  6079 HU_f  5436 HU_f  5208  HU_f  4929
EE_f  7088.6  PL_f  6583  PL_f  6054 PL_f  5288 PL_f  4653  PL_f  3768
PL_f  7086.8  HU_m  6500  EE_m  5874 PL_m  5210 PL_m  4468  PL_m  3486
HU_m  6963.1  EE_f  6326  HU_f  5846 EE_m  4856 EE_f  4176  EE_f  3434
HU_f  6739.1  HU_f  6268  EE_f  5607 EE_f  4760 EE_m  4141  EE_m  3267
Annotations: See Table 2.Moreover, appendix “ _f” denotes the ranking for females, “_m” the ranking of males.  15
the ordering of men and women for Norway, Poland and Estonia. The last column ( = 2) 
ranks women better than men for these three countries plus Switzerland and the UK. Given 
such a comparatively large risk aversion it is better to be ‘born’ into these countries as a 
woman, although women enjoy a lower expected income.  
 
This tendency that a higher coefficient of relative risk aversion leads to a comparatively better 
evaluation of female income distributions can be observed more generally. While the relative 
gap in the certainty equivalent of men compared to women on average across countries is 
5.1% when  = 0, it is only 3.5% when  = 2. Or, put differently, the figures in Table 4 imply 
that the average risk premium that had to be paid somebody to accept the relevant 
distributions  for women rather than that for men is €979 for  = 0 and €436 for  = 2.  
 
These results provide a new perspective on the income distributions of men and women and 
may be contrasted with the study by Bonke, Deding and  Lausten (2003) who calculate Gini 
coefficients for women in European countries. Their finding is that the coefficient is normally 
larger for women than for households, with Denmark being an exception. On the other hand, 
Wiepking and Maas (2005) conclude that lower poverty (receiving less than 50% of the 
median income) for women in the mid 1990s was less exceptional, with 7 out of 23 countries 
having such a situation (Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden 
and Ireland). 
 
3.3.2 Has there been an Age of Diminished Expectations? 
In this subsection we want to discuss the development of individual countries over time. In a 
well-known book, Paul Krugman (1990) concluded that, since the mid 1970s, prospects for 
U.S. workers had declined at least at the bottom fifth of the income distribution. The concept 
of the veil of ignorance leads us to look at expectations from a slightly different angle. Using 
the concept of expected utility, what was the best time to be ‘born’ into a specific country? 
Has it always been best to be ‘born’ into the latest available year or has there been a time of 
diminished expectation in the sense that the expected utility and the CEI of our hypothetical 
entrant was decreasing for some periods?   
 
For this purpose we use all available countries and years provided by the (all) six waves of 
LIS database with the exception of those countries mentioned in footnote 5. The same 
procedure and assumptions were adopted for the calculation of the mean equivalized and   16
certainty equivalent income. (MEI, CEI) as in the former sections of this paper. I.e. individual 
utilities were aggregated and weighted to receive the overall expected utility and certainty 
equivalent. The values of MEI and CEI are per capita figures, purchasing power adjusted and 
transformed into US Dollars.  
 
Beside reporting on CEIs over time and for different values of risk aversion, Table 5 identifies 
those instances where there was a time of diminished expectations. A cell has been shaded in 
red when, for the relevant value of , CEI has decreased compared to the last survey. The cell 
is shaded in yellow when there was a improvement compared to the last survey, but a 
deterioration with respect to the penultimate. Finland (1990-1995), Hungary (1990-1995), and 
Sweden (1990-1995) are the three countries where we could identify the time of diminished 
expectations for all four values of 
The identification of a time of diminished expectation 
depends on the value of . With the exception of Netherlands (1990-1995), where we detect a 
time of diminished expectations for  ≤ 1,
8 for much more cases, like Austria (1980-1995), 
Canada (1980-1985), the Czech Republic (1990-1995), France (1980-1985), Israel (1995-
2005), Italy (1990-1995), Switzerland (1980-1990), (2000-2005), and the United 
Kingdom(1980-85), (1990-1995), a time of diminished expectations requires  > 1. In these 
cases, the per capita income corrected for inequality decreased, while per capita income 
increased.  
 
In several cases, exceptional circumstances that are highly plausible reasons for deterioration 
come into mind. In the first half of the 1990s, Finland, Italy and Sweden experienced 
deteriorations of expected utility (at least for  ≥ 1). At the same time, these countries were 
among those that were distressed most severely by the 1992 currency crises, which hit the 
European Monetary System and its periphery. The transition from a communist economy to a 
market economy is behind the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
 
Israel (for  = 2) is the only country in our sample for which the time of diminished 
expectation expands over more than two five year interval.  
  
                                                 
7 Clearly, the occurrence of such an event is dependent on the length of the time periods. Comparing adjacent 
years may increase the occurrence compared to looking at five year intervals as all years with negative per capita 
growth of disposable real income would show up for  = 0. 
8 In the case of the Netherlands, we find a reversal. From 1980 to 1985 there is no reduction for high values of , 
but only for  ≤ 1. Recall that Observation 1 has established the possibility of such reversals.  
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MEI
Austria  1985  13787  13290  96  12800  93  12299  89  11765  85 
Austria  1995  15957  14917  93  13790  86  12503  78  10965  69 
Austria  2000  21220  20024  94  18783  89  17219  81  14368  68 
Austria  2005  25605  24038  94  22522  88  20819  81  18182  71 
Belgium  1985  10329  9906  96  9482  92  9022  87  7675  74 
Belgium  1990  13674  13117  96  12552  92  11943  87  11161  82 
Belgium  1995  17049  16008  94  14987  88  13816  81  12077  71 
Belgium  2000  20775  19360  93  18092  87  16777  81  15038  72 
Canada  1970  4721  4283  91  3787  80  3132  66  2191  46 
Canada  1975  6694  6184  92  5619  84  4903  73  3824  57 
Canada  1980  12016  11161  93  10235  85  9081  76  7278  61 
Canada  1985  15663  14617  93  13496  86  12140  78  10060  64 
Canada  1990  18281  17037  93  15746  86  14215  78  11876  65 
Canada  1995  19650  18285  93  16877  86  15242  78  12821  65 
Canada  2000  23355  21370  92  19342  83  16701  72  12195  52 
Canada  2005  28305  25879  91  23442  83  20456  72  15576  55 
Czech Republic  1990  7028  6761 96 6529 93 6369 91  6181  88
Czech Republic  1995  7392  6978 94 6608 89 6313 85  6011  81
Denmark  1985  12810  12198  95  11430  89  9974  78  6614  52 
Denmark  1990  13671  12962  95  12134  89  10760  79  7758  57 
Denmark  1995  16402  15734  96  15048  92  14170  86  12407  76 
Denmark  2000  21161  20245  96  19313  91  18127  86  15723  74 
Denmark  2005  23295  22243  95  21151  91  19682  84  16556  71 
Estonia  2000  7278  6490  89  5730  79  4804  66  3355  46 
Finland  1985  11854  11471  97  11063  93  10570  89  9775  82 
Finland  1990  14794  14240  96  13655  92  12946  88  11765  80 
Finland  1995  13913  13356  96    12825  92  12264  88  11481  83 
Finland  2000  17712  16786  95  15930  90  15011  85  13605  77 
Finland  2005  21662  20485  95  19392  90  18242  84  16639  77 
France  1980  8645  8072  93  7510  87  6887  80  6053  70 
France  1985  10129  9290  92  8107  80  5875  58  2798  28 
France  1990  12744  11805  93  10715  84  8884  70  5467  43 
France  1995  16399  15262  93  14232  87  13198  80  11876  72 
France  2000  18364  17196  94  16079  88  14817  81  12706  69   18
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Germany  1970  5279  4949  94  4623  88  4229  80  3542  67 
Germany  1975  7693  7234  94  6804  88  6331  82  5596  73 
Germany  1980  9555  9045  95  8537  89  7967  83  7138  75 
Germany  1985  12382  11646  94  10932  88  10024  81  8224  66 
Germany  1990  15163  14286  94  13396  88  12174  80  9653  64 
Germany  1995  16628  15572  94  14510  87  13211  79  11025  66 
Germany  2000  20358  19054  94  17809  87  16476  81  14663  72 
Germany  2005  22860  21370  93  19994  87  18631  81  17094  75 
Greece  1995  10715  9611  90  8468  79  7061  66  5018  47 
Greeece  2000  13698  12437  91  11176  82  9719  71  7536  55 
Greeece  2005  18344  16681  91  15023  82  13003  71  9766  53 
Hungary  1990  7693  7165  93  6673  87  6173  80  5615  73 
Hungary  1995  4638  4235  91    3863  83  3476  75  2959  64 
Hungary  2000  6842  6374  93    5952  87  5547  81  5089  74 
Hungary  2005  8953  8318  93  7752  87  7203  80  6605  74 
Ireland  1985  9316  8414  90  7482  80  6202  67  4057  44 
Ireland  1995  14822  13455  91  12268  83  11196  76  10173  69 
Ireland  2000  19098  17514  92  15974  84  14146  74  11086  58 
Israel  1985  12228  11359  93  10530  86  9723  80  8913  73 
Israel  1990  13385  12391  93  11475  86  10619  79  9814  73 
Israel  1995  15736  14247  91  12816  81  11283  72  9200  58 
Israel  2000  16393  14781  90  13256  81  11591  71  9149  56 
Israel  2005  16891  14989  89  13118  78  11000  65  8039  48 
Italy  1985  10617  9820  92  9066  85  8321  78  7530  71 
Italy  1990  12931  11961  93  11068  86  10169  79  9017  70 
Italy  1995  13928  12580  90  11215  81  9502  68  6780  49 
Italy  2000  16882  15298  91  13765  82  12003  71  9355  55 
Italy  2005  18169  16393  90  14746  81  12921  71  10299  57 
Luxembourg  1985  14772  14124  96  13489  91  12838  87  12107  82 
Luxembourg  1990  24980  23823  95  22761  91  21771  87  20833  83 
Luxembourg  1995  27333  26121  96  24966  91  23844  87  22727  83 
Luxembourg  2000  31040  29365  95  27820  90  26381  85  25000  81 
Luxembourg  2005  41620  39141  94  36777  88  34313  82  31153  75 
Netherlands  1985  9604  9048  94  8373  87  7124  74  4437  46 
Netherlands  1990  15567  14551  93  13374  86  11385  73  7463  48 
Netherlands  1995  15389  14462  94    13325  87  11616  75  8651  56 
Netherlands  2000  20792  19851  95  18863  91  17610  85  15361  74   19
 Table 5: Certainty Equivalent Incomes (in US$ & PPP adjusted), General Population (continued) 
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Norway  1980  7300  6953  95  6572  90  6056  83  5074  69 
Norway  1985  14859  14295  96  13711  92  12998  87  11723  79 
Norway  1990  16982  16180  95  15373  91  14402  85  12804  75 
Norway  1995  18299  17354  95  16387  90  15132  83  12804  70 
Norway  2000  23888  22475  94  21111  88  19270  81  15456  65 
Norway  2005  28569  26827  94  25168  88  23095  81  19231  67 
Poland  1995  4846  4395  91  3860  80  2936  61  1524  31 
Poland  2000  7152  6631  93  6076  85  5251  73  3628  51 
Poland  2005  7803  7118  91  6440  83  5561  71  4013  51 
Spain  1990  9468  8780  93  8103  86  7360  78  6337  67 
Spain  1995  13899  12430  89  10876  78  8783  63  5583  40 
Spain  2000  17772  16105  91  14483  81  12596  71  9690  55 
Spain  2005  18689  17144  92  15541  83  13621  73  10718  57 
Sweden  1975  4746  4555  96  4334  91  4016  85  3366  71 
Sweden  1980  7419  7154  96  6850  92  6435  87  5647  76 
Sweden  1985  10506  10099  96  9583  91  8647  82  6361  61 
Sweden  1990  14922  14216  95  13396  90  12185  82  9747  65 
Sweden  1995  13462  12823  95    12056  90  10873  81  8562  64 
Sweden  2000  18298  17274  94  16243  89  14962  82  12690  69 
Sweden  2005  20528  19532  95  18536  90  17346  84  15314  75 
Switzerland  1980  15692  14287  91  13031  83  11548  74  9009  57 
Switzerland  1990  23678  21488  91  18466  78  12682  54  5552  23 
Switzerland  2000  26184  24393  93  22586  86  20119  77  15244  58 
Switzerland  2005  28466  26649  94  24559  86  21083  74  13966  49 
Slovenia  2000  12983  12302  95  11603  89  10838  83  9911  76 
Taiwan  1980  4677  4408  94  4166  89  3941  84  3717  79 
Taiwan  1985  7693  7225  94  6811  89  6426  84  6017  78 
Taiwan  1990  13740  12917  94  12171  89  11475  84  10787  79 
Taiwan  1995  18978  17801  94  16727  88  15720  83  14728  78 
Taiwan  2000  21581  20106  93  18743  87  17425  81  16026  74 
Taiwan  2005  23858  22031  92  20356  85  18734  79  16978  71 
United Kingdom  1970  2956  2775  94  2610  88  2448  83  2257  76 
United Kingdom  1975  4173  3911  94  3666  88  3415  82  3091  74 
United Kingdom  1980  6581  6181  94  5748  87  5144  78  3946  60 
United Kingdom  1985  11357  10401  92  9143  81  6834  60  3374  30 
United Kingdom  1990  14795  13408  91  12050  81  10423  70  7800  53   20
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United Kingdom  1995  15886  14291  90  12649  80  10422  66  6821  43 
United Kingdom  2000  20739  18654  90  16641  80  14145  68  10000  48 
United Kingdom  2005  25482  22930  90  20547  81  17664  69  12821  50 
United States  1975  6267  5709  91  5073  81  4182  67  2779  44 
United States  1980  9983  9178  92  8245  83  6963  70  4914  49 
United States  1985  16544  15093  91  13440  81  11170  68  7541  46 
United States  1990  18916  17098  90  15137  80  12732  67  9285  49 
United States  1995  21526  19136  89  16632  77  13623  63  9542  44 
United States  2000  29018  25692  89  22535  78  19007  66  14164  49 
United States     2005    33228    29294  88   25515  77   21193  64    15314  46 
 
Annotations. CEI: certainty equivalent income; MEI: mean expected income.  
 
 
3.3.2 Development of Rankings over Time 
The detailed rankings in Table 2 to Table 4 were all set up for the year 2000. A natural 
question to ask is about the stability of these rankings over time.  
 
To address this question we draw on Table 5 to produce rankings for the various years for 
general population. The resulting rankings are presented in Table 6a. Similarly, Tables 6b-6d 
exhibit rankings over time for subgroups of the population, namely prime age population (24-
60), male population and female population. These additional rankings are based on additional 
calculations that are available on request. Throughout Tables 6a-6d, Luxemburg retains its 
highest rank for the time period (1990-2005) and 0 ≤  ≤ 2. In all these tables, if one country 
either loses or gains at least four notches when moving from  = 0 to  = 2 in any year are 
highlighted. On the stability side, for  = 2 we see that the US is always below Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Taiwan, and Norway in all kinds of rankings presented in Tables 6a-6d,  if the 
respective data is available. Conversely, a country that has been falling behind is Germany 
after unification. This is quite understandable as addition of East Germany and comparatively 
slow growth since the 1980s have decreased average income. Two Nordic countries that have 
fallen behind are Finland and Sweden. The financial crisis in the early 1990s may be a reason.    21
 































































































































Epsilon  Epsilon=0  Epsilon=1 Epsilon=2
LU  LU  LU  LU  US  CH  DE  DE  LU  LU  LU  LU  NO  CH  DE  DE  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  CH  DE  DE 
US  US  US  CH  CA  CA  CA  CA  US  CH  CA  CH  CA  CA  CA  CA  NO  TW  TW  NO  AT  CA  CA  UK 
NO  CH  CA  US  NO  US  US  UK  NO  US  TW  CA  LU  DE  US  UK  AT  DK  CA  CA  NO  DE  SE  CA 
CH  NO  TW  CA  LU  DE  SE  CH  NO  US  NO  US  US  SE  DE  NO  NO  FI  CA  FR  UK 
CA  CA  NO  NO  AT  FR  UK  CA  CA  NO  US  AT  FR  UK  TW  NL  DK  BE  FI  SE  US 
AT  TW  BE  NL  DK  SE  AT  DK  DK  FI  DK  SE  FI  CH  BE  TW  IL  NO 
UK  AT  DE  DE  DE  NO  DK  NL  BE  SE  FI  NO  DK  BE  FR  IL  DE  US 
TW  DK  DK  SE  IL  UK  UK  AT  DE  DE  DE  UK  CA  DE  FI  SE  BE  UK 
DK  NL  FR  UK  FI  TW  TW  TW  FR  NL  IL  TW  SE  AT  DE  DE  US  TW 
DE  BE  AT  FI  UK  NL  DE  BE  AT  BE  SE  NL  US  US  AT  US  IT 
FI  UK  UK  TW  IT  FI  DE  NL  TW  BE  CH  FI  IE  IT  DK 
SE  DE  IL  BE  SE  SE  UK  FI  DK  UK  UK  FR  US  UK  SE 
ES  IE  NL  DK  BE  ES  SE  IL  UK  IT  ES  SE  IL  DK  TW 
GR  FR  IE  IL  FR  GR  FR  UK  IL  NL  IT  CA  NL  NL  NL 
IT  SE  IT  IT  NL  IT  IE  IE  IT  FR  GR  IE  SE  ES  IE 
IL  ES  FI  FR  IE  IL  FI  SE  FR  IE  IL  UK  UK  HU  UK 
HU  FI  ES  ES  TW  HU  ES  IT  ES  TW  HU  SI  IT  CH  FR 
PL  IT  SE  HU  PL  IT  ES  HU  PL  ES  ES  FR 
IL  GR  IL  GR  IT  GR 
GR  PL  SI  HU  IL  HU 
SI  HU  GR  PL  GR  PL 
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Epsilon  Epsilon=0  Epsilon=1 Epsilon=2
LU  LU  LU  LU  US  CH  CA  CA  LU  LU  LU  LU  NO  CH  CA  CA  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  CH  CA  UK 
US  US  US  CH  CA  CA  US  UK  US  US  US  CH  CA  CA  US  UK  NO  TW  TW  NO  AT  DE  SE  CA 
CH  CH  CA  US  NO  US  SE  NO  CH  CA  US  LU  DE  SE  TW  BE  CA  CA  NO  CA  UK 
NO  NO  TW  CA  LU  DE  UK  CH  NO  NO  CA  US  US  UK  DE  NL  NO  FI  CA  SE  US 
CA  CA  NO  NO  AT  FR  CA  DK  TW  NO  AT  FR  AT  DK  DK  BE  FI  FR 
UK  UK  BE  NL  DK  SE  AT  NL  DK  SE  DK  SE  DK  DE  BE  TW  IL  NO 
AT  BE  DE  UK  DE  NO  UK  CA  BE  FI  FI  NO  FI  CH  FR  DE  DE  US 
TW  DK  DK  SE  IL  UK  DK  BE  DE  NL  DE  UK  US  NO  DE  SE  BE  UK 
DK  TW  UK  DE  FI  TW  TW  TW  FR  DE  IL  TW  CA  US  FI  IL  US  TW 
DE  AT  FR  FI  UK  DE  AT  AT  UK  SE  SE  FI  IE  US  IT 
FI  NL  AT  DK  IT  FI  DE  NL  DK  BE  CH  FR  AT  IT  DK 
SE  DE  IE  TW  SE  SE  UK  UK  BE  UK  UK  SE  US  DK  SE 
ES  IE  NL  BE  BE  ES  SE  IE  TW  IT  ES  AT  IL  NL  TW 
GR  SE  IL  IL  FR  GR  IE  FI  IL  NL  IT  IE  SE  UK  NL 
IT  FR  ES  IT  NL  IT  FI  IL  IT  FR  GR  CA  NL  ES  IE 
IL  ES  IT  FR  IE  IL  FR  SE  FR  IE  IL  SI  IT  HU  UK 
HU  FI  SE  ES  TW  HU  ES  IT  ES  TW  HU  ES  UK  FR  FR 
PL  IT  FI  HU  PL  IT  ES  HU  PL  IT  ES  CH 
IL  GR  IL  GR  UK  GR 
GR  PL  GR  HU  IL  HU 
SI  HU  SI  PL  GR  PL 
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Epsilon  Epsilon=0  Epsilon=1 Epsilon=2
LU  LU  LU  LU  US  CH  DE  DE  LU  LU  LU  LU  NO  CH  DE  DE  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  CH  DE  DE 
US  US  US  CH  CA  CA  CA  CA  US  US  US  CH  LU  CA  CA  CA  AT  TW  TW  NO  AT  CA  CA  UK 
NO  CH  CA  US  NO  US  US  UK  NO  CH  CA  CA  CA  US  US  UK  NO  DE  CA  FI  NO  DE  SE  CA 
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AT  TW  DE  DE  DE  SE  DK  AT  BE  DE  DK  NO  DK  CH  FR  TW  BE  US 
TW  DK  DK  UK  IL  UK  UK  NL  DE  NL  DE  UK  CA  AT  DE  IL  US  UK 
DK  BE  FR  FI  FI  TW  DE  TW  FR  SE  IL  TW  US  NO  FI  US  DE  TW 
DE  UK  AT  SE  UK  TW  BE  AT  BE  BE  CH  US  AT  SE  IT 
FI  NL  UK  DK  IT  FI  DE  NL  UK  IT  SE  FI  IE  IT  DK 
SE  DE  IL  BE  BE  SE  UK  IL  DK  UK  UK  FR  US  DK  SE 
ES  IE  NL  TW  FR  ES  SE  FI  TW  SE  ES  SE  IL  UK  TW 
IT  SE  IE  IL  SE  GR  IE  UK  IL  NL  IT  CA  NL  NL  UK 
GR  FR  IT  IT  NL  IT  FR  IE  IT  FR  GR  IE  SE  ES  IE 
IL  ES  FI  FR  IE  IL  FI  SE  FR  IE  IL  ES  IT  HU  NL 
HU  FI  ES  ES  TW  HU  ES  IT  ES  TW  HU  SI  UK  FR  FR 
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Epsilon  Epsilon=0  Epsilon=1 Epsilon=2
LU  LU  LU  LU  US  CH  DE  DE  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  CH  DE  DE  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  CH  DE  DE 
US  US  US  CH  CA  CA  CA  CA  NO  CH  TW  CH  CA  CA  CA  CA  NO  NO  TW  NO  NO  DE  CA  UK 
NO  CH  CA  US  LU  US  US  UK  US  US  CA  CA  NO  DE  US  UK  AT  TW  NO  CA  AT  CA  SE  CA 
CH  NO  TW  CA  NO  DE  SE  CH  NO  US  NO  US  US  SE  TW  DK  CA  FI  CA  FR  UK 
CA  CA  NO  NO  AT  FR  UK  CA  CA  NO  US  AT  FR  UK  DK  CH  DK  BE  FI  SE  US 
AT  TW  BE  NL  IL  SE  AT  DK  DK  FI  FI  SE  FI  NL  FR  TW  IL  NO 
UK  DK  DE  SE  DK  NO  DK  TW  BE  SE  DK  NO  DE  BE  BE  SE  BE  US 
TW  AT  FR  DE  DE  UK  TW  NL  DE  NL  IL  UK  SE  AT  FI  IL  IT  UK 
DK  NL  DK  FI  FI  TW  UK  AT  FR  DE  DE  TW  CA  US  AT  IT  US  TW 
DE  BE  AT  UK  UK  DE  BE  AT  BE  BE  US  DE  DE  US  DE 
FI  UK  UK  TW  IT  FI  DE  NL  TW  IT  UK  FI  IE  DE  DK 
SE  DE  IL  BE  BE  SE  UK  FI  DK  SE  CH  SE  US  UK  SE 
ES  IE  NL  DK  FR  ES  FR  IL  UK  UK  ES  FR  IL  DK  TW 
GR  FR  IE  IL  SE  GR  SE  UK  IL  NL  IT  CA  SE  NL  IE 
IT  SE  ES  IT  NL  IT  FI  IE  IT  FR  GR  IE  NL  ES  UK 
IL  FI  IT  FR  IE  IL  IE  SE  FR  TW  IL  UK  UK  CH  NL 
HU  ES  FI  ES  TW  HU  ES  IT  ES  IE  HU  SI  IT  HU  FR 
PL  IT  SE  HU  PL  IT  ES  HU  PL  ES  ES  FR 
IL  GR  IL  GR  IL  GR 
GR  PL  SI  PL  IT  HU 




Annotations: See Table 2. Placement of countries in Table 6a is based on calculations presented in Table 5; for Table 6b-6d calculations are available on request.    25
 
                                                                          







































































































1  US  LU  LU  NO  LU  LU  LU  LU LU 1 US  LU  LU  NO  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU 
2  CA  US  US  CA  CA  US  AT  TW NO 2 CA  US  US  CA  US  US  AT  TW  NO 
3  NO  CA  NO  LU  TW  NO  NO CA AT 3 NO  CA  NO  LU  CA  NO  NO  CA  TW 
4  LU  TW  CA  US  US  CA  CA  NO DE 4 LU  TW  CA  US  NO  CA  CA  NO  DE 
5  AT  NO  AT  AT  NO  AT  FI  DK TW 5 AT  NO  UK  AT  TW  AT  FI  DK  AT 
6  DK  DE  UK  DK  DK  DK  IL  FI  FI  6 DK  DE  AT  DK  DK  UK  IL  DE  DK 
7  DE  DK  TW  FI  DE  UK  DE  DE DK 7 DE  DK  TW  FI  DE  DK  DE  FI  FI 
8  IL  AT  DK  DE  AT  TW  US  AT CA 8 IL  UK  DK  DE  AT  TW  US  AT  US 
9  FI  UK  DE  IL  FI  DE  IT  US SE 9 FI  AT  DE  IL  UK  DE  IT  US  CA 
10  UK  IL  FI  SE  IL  FI  DK  IL  US 10 UK  IL  FI  SE  FI  FI  DK  IL  SE 
11  IT  IT  SE  UK  UK  SE  SE  SE UK 11 IT  IT  SE  UK  IL  SE  SE  SE  UK 
12  SE  FI  IT  IT  SE  IT  TW UK IT  12 SE  SE  IT  IT  SE  IT  TW  IT  IT 
13 TW  SE  IL     TW  IT  IL     UK  IT  IL  13 TW  FI  IL   TW  IT  IL     UK  UK  IL 
                                                                     







































































































1  US  LU  LU  NO  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  1 US  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU  LU 
2  CA  US  US  LU  US  US  AT  TW AT  2 CA  US  US  CA  TW  NO  NO  TW  NO 
3  NO  CA  NO  CA  CA  NO  NO  CA  NO 3 LU  CA  NO  NO  CA  US  AT  NO  AT 
4  LU  TW  CA  US  NO  CA  CA  NO DE  4 NO  TW  CA  US  US  CA  CA  CA  TW 
5  AT  NO  UK  AT  TW  AT  FI  DK  TW 5 AT  NO  AT  AT  NO  AT  FI  DK  DK 
6  DK  DE  AT  FI  DK  DK  IL  DE  FI  6 IL  DE  UK  FI  DK  DK  IL  FI  FI 
7  DE  DK  TW  DK  DE  UK  US  FI  DK  7 DK  DK  TW  DK  DE  TW  IT  AT  DE 
8  IL  AT  DK  DE  AT  DE  DE  AT  CA  8 DE  AT  DK  IL  AT  UK  US  DE  SE 
9  FI  UK  DE  IL  IL  TW  IT  US  US  9 FI  UK  DE  DE  FI  DE  DE  US  CA 
10 UK  IL  FI  IT  FI  FI  DK  IL  SE  10 UK  IL  FI  IT  IL  FI  DK  IL  US 
11 IT  IT  SE  UK  UK  SE  SE  SE  UK  11 IT  IT  SE  SE  UK  SE  SE  SE  UK 
12 SE  FI  IT  SE  SE  IT  TW  IT  IT  12 SE  FI  IT  UK  SE  IT  TW  UK  IT 
13 TW  SE  IL     TW  IT  IL     UK  UK  IL     13 TW  SE  IL   TW  IT  IL     UK  IT  IL 
Annotations: See Table 2. Placement of countries in Table 7a is based on calculations presented in Table 5; for Table 7b-7d 
calculations are available on request.  
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For a more transparent picture of rank changes over time we also report rankings for selected 
countries for which data was available for all benchmark years (1980-2005) out of all 
countries included in the analysis. Results are presented in Table 7. In all these consistent 
sample based tables, countries that either lose or gain at least three (rather than four) places 
when moving from  = 0 to  = 2 are highlighted. A majority of the countries experience shifts 
or rank changes for higher assumed levels of risk aversion compared to their rank in mean 
expected income (MEI). US and UK show particularly pronounced downward shifts for 
higher values of risk aversion. This prevails in rankings done for sub groups of population. 
Finland and Taiwan are examples of countries that always see improvements in their ranks as 
 goes up. This also holds for sub groups of populations.  
 
4. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This paper offers an evaluation of real world income distributions from a veil of ignorance 
perspective in which a hypothetical risk averse individual has to decide on the economy she 
would like to be ‘born’ into. A main conclusion that can be drawn from our exercise of 
calculating certainty equivalent incomes for a large set of developed countries is that the 
differences in income inequality indeed matter strongly for the ranking of our sample of 24 
developed countries. Assuming a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2, many European 
countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Norway are able to 
overtake the US, which gauged by average real household income is outperforming all 
European countries except Luxembourg.  
 
The magnitude of the risk aversion does also play a role for the question of whether countries 
have always improved over time. Using data on five year intervals, we have identified spells 
during which expected disposable income has increased, while the certainty equivalent of that 
disposable income has not, implying what we call a time of diminished expectation.  
 
Our study compares incomes across countries after deducting from real disposable income a 
risk premium depending on observed income inequality. This approach combines two sets of 
problems. It shares the problems inherent in the cross country comparisons of income. At the 
same time, it also faces the problems that arise in comparing income distributions 
internationally. This should be kept in mind.  
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As in simple cross-country comparisons, nominal incomes have to be translated into real 
income in one common currency, which obviously depends on the reliability of purchasing 
power parity indices. While we have excluded countries where social assistance is obviously 
not included in the data, data on disposable income cannot be expected to adequately reflect in 
kind benefits provided by governments, such as health care. Similarly, publicly provided 
goods are ignored, probably making countries with a large public sector look inadequately 
poor. An important caveat is that no correction for different amounts of leisure has been made, 
which should bias the deck in favor of the U.S., in particular when compared to continental 
Europe. At the same time, statistics of disposable income may underestimate the amount of 
capital gains, leading to a bias against economies where share ownership is particularly 
important.  
 
Although recent efforts such as the Luxembourg Income Survey have greatly contributed to 
our knowledge of income distributions across countries, comparisons imply some difficult 
choices and data problems. For example, in some countries, a considerable fraction of the 
population is not represented because of imprisonment. Perhaps more importantly, the LIS 
data used represent a snapshot and does not allow comparing income mobility over time.  
 
At the same time, all these problems are inherent in either cross country comparisons of 
disposable income or in cross-country comparisons of income inequality and are usually not 
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